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REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AS HEALTH CARE
RIGHTS
B. JESSIE HILL*
The idea that abortion rights are central to protecting women’s
health will hardly come as a surprise to most reproductive rights advocates.
For example, much of the recent litigation challenging states’ legal
restrictions on abortion has centered around the requirement of a health
exception—that is, around the question of whether legislation regulating
abortion must contain an exception for cases where the regulated procedure
is necessary to protect the woman’s health. 1 Reproductive rights
organizations also often espouse the language of “women’s health.” 2

* Associate Professor and Associate Director of the Center for Social Justice, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. I would like to thank the Columbia Journal of
Gender and Law and the Center for Reproductive Rights for inviting me to participate in this
symposium. I would also like to thank Jessica Berg, Sharona Hoffman, and Max Mehlman
for their helpful comments and suggestions. Justine Konicki and Jack Blanton provided
excellent research assistance. All errors are mine.
1

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502, 511–12,
517 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding the district court’s preliminary injunction against a state law
regulating the abortion drug mifepristone, also known as RU-486, on the ground that the lack
of a health exception may pose significant risks to some women’s health but remanding to
the district court for reconsideration of the scope of the injunction); Planned Parenthood of
Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 930 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking down Idaho’s parental
consent law due to the insufficiency of its health exception); Planned Parenthood of Rocky
Mountains Servs. Corp. v. Owens, 287 F.3d 910, 927 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that
Colorado’s parental notice law “is unconstitutional because it fails to provide a health
exception as required by the Constitution of the United States”). Litigation over the health
exception is probably less likely in the future, due to the Supreme Court’s holding in
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007), that the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban
Act was facially constitutional despite its lack of a health exception.
2

The Center for Reproductive Rights draws an explicit connection between the
human right to health and reproductive rights. See, e.g., Letter from Melissa Upreti, Legal
Advisor for Asia, Center for Reproductive Rights, to the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee), at 1, 3 (Jan. 15, 2007),
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub_sl_CEDAW_Indi
a2007.pdf. The American Civil Liberties Union’s Reproductive Freedom Project decries the
threat to women’s health posed by the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, Press Release,
American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU and National Abortion Federation Criticize Decision
by U.S. Supreme Court Upholding Federal Abortion Ban (Apr. 18, 2007),
http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/abortion/29423prs20070418.html, and by rules

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1490073
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Indeed, those organizations, along with numerous other NGOs and some
scholars, advocate greater recognition of the fact that reproductive health
care in all its manifestations—not just access to abortion and contraception,
but also access to safe obstetric and gynecologic care, adequate prenatal
nutrition and care, and sexually transmitted disease prevention—is an
important part of women’s health care in general.3 At the same time,
however, feminist legal scholars have largely shied away from discussing
abortion as primarily a medical procedure, instead emphasizing the idea of
abortion as an intensely personal decision and as a right that is essential to
women’s equal citizenship. This framework underscores the concepts of
decisional autonomy and equality underpinning the constitutional right to
choose abortion. Although there are valid reasons for the emphasis taken by
those reproductive rights scholars, this Article argues that it may be time to
consider embracing an approach that emphasizes abortion as a form of
health care.
If abortion is placed in the framework of health care, the right to
access abortion may then be considered to be an aspect of the right to
health. This right to health, moreover, should be conceived as a negative
right, not as a positive right. Although the distinction between positive and
negative rights is not always airtight, 4 it may be roughly described as
follows. A positive right is generally considered to be an entitlement to
something—a right to call on the government to provide, at government
expense, a particular public good, such as shelter, education, or medical
care. 5 Such rights are sometimes referred to as “socio–economic rights,”
and they are recognized as constitutional rights in a number of foreign
countries. 6 International law and numerous national constitutions,
allowing individuals and entities to opt out of providing reproductive health care services,
Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Calls Again for Withdrawal of
Regulations
Jeopardizing
Women’s
Health
(Sept.
28,
2008),
http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/gen/36945prs20080926.html.
3
See, e.g., Serra Sippel, Achieving Global Sexual and Reproductive Health and
Rights, 35 HUM. RTS. 13, 13 (2008); Cynthia Soohoo & Suzanne Stolz, Bringing Theories of
Human Rights Change Home, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 480–81 (2008).
4
Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and
Economic Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2005) (questioning the distinction
between negative and positive rights as it is conventionally understood).
5
Id. at 5; Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review,
82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1895 (2004).
6

See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 3–4 (citing examples of constitutions that recognize
positive rights); Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1895 n.2.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1490073
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moreover, specifically recognize a right to health, which is in most
instances understood as a positive entitlement to health care.7 Negative
rights, by contrast, are simply rights to be free of governmental interference
with one’s decision to do something; they are “negative checks on
government, preserving a sphere of private immunity.” 8 The United States
Constitution is usually understood to confer only negative rights; this
understanding is largely based on a perception that negative rights fit best
within the paradigm of classical liberalism, that they are more easily
enforceable by courts than positive rights, and that their recognition does
not generally have major budgetary implications. Consequently, the judicial
enforcement of negative rights does not raise the separation of powers
concerns that might be raised by court–ordered rearrangement of legislative
priorities and substantial monetary outlays to provide certain goods to the
public. 9 A negative right to health could thus be understood as a right
against government interference in health care access and medical
decision–making, rather than a right to government–provided medical
services.
As this Article demonstrates, the Supreme Court’s abortion
jurisprudence suggests the existence of a negative right to health, but this
notion has not yet been fully explored by courts or by advocates. Thus,
although the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly embraced the notion of a
right to medical decision–making autonomy or a right to health, it is a
concept whose time has come. Indeed, other countries have started to
recognize and operationalize a negative right to health in ways that
encompass the right to reproductive health care. These countries’
jurisprudence may serve as model for thinking about how such a right could
be understood and incorporated into U.S. law.

7

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 76, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); Int’l Covenant on Econ., Soc. &
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 51, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N.
Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); see generally Eleanor D. Kinney & Brian Alexander Clark,
Provisions for Health and Health Care in the Constitutions of the Countries of the World, 37
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 285 (2004) (compiling provisions relating to the right to health care, if
any, in the constitution of every country in the world).
8
9

Sunstein, supra note 4, at 4 (internal citation omitted).

Id. at 4–5; Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1895–97; Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights,
62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1392–94 (1984). Cass Sunstein, for one, questions whether those
rationales, or many of the others commonly given, adequately explain the absence of positive
rights in the United States. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 8–19.
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Thus, this Article draws on models from other countries in order to
consider, in broad strokes, what a negative right to health might be
understood to mean. Specifically, this Article discusses two cases in which
the high courts of other countries have recognized and applied a
constitutional right to health in ways that seem particularly applicable and
translatable to American constitutional law. Both the Canadian Supreme
Court and the Constitutional Court of South Africa have recently rendered
decisions exploring and applying the constitutional right to health to cases
outside the abortion context.10 This right to health, which is conceived by
those courts, at least in part, as a negative right to noninterference with
medical treatment decisions and the doctor–patient relationship, can and
should be recognized in the United States as well, along with the rights to
privacy, autonomy, and bodily integrity protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive due process guarantees.11 In addition, the right to
choose abortion can and should be understood to be protected in part (but
not exclusively) by that right. The Canadian and South African decisions
may therefore provide a model for shaping both legal and political
discourse concerning reproductive rights around the notion of a negative
right to health.
Embracing this discourse will have distinct legal and political
advantages for reproductive rights advocates. First, it may provide a
framework for challenging certain kinds of restrictions on abortion rights
that can be extraordinarily burdensome yet are usually found to be
constitutional under current reproductive rights jurisprudence. Further, it
may help to create broader political appeal for the protection of
reproductive rights by placing those rights in a gender–neutral context to
which a large portion of the population can relate. Of course, a discourse
foregrounding the right to choose abortion as an aspect of a negative right
to health also has certain limitations. It will not improve access to abortion
for women who cannot afford it, for example, and it may not be sufficient to
protect the core of the right to abortion itself. This Article does not,
therefore, advocate viewing abortion rights only as growing out of a
negative right to access medical care without government interference.
Rather, this Article argues that this is one way to frame abortion rights,
which may be particularly useful for certain purposes, and that this

10

Chaoulli v. Québec, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.); Minister of Health v. Treatment
Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (S. Afr.).
11
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).

2008]

Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights

5

framework should be deployed alongside existing arguments about privacy,
autonomy, equality, and dignity.
Part I of this Article demonstrates that the conceptualization of
reproductive rights as an aspect of a negative right to health was an early
feature of Supreme Court jurisprudence, but that both the Court’s more
recent jurisprudence and legal scholars’ analyses have moved away from
this understanding. Instead, the Court’s jurisprudence has been grounded in
concepts of privacy, equality, and autonomy in making important life
decisions. Part I also proposes some reasons why feminist scholars have
tended to downplay the view of abortion rights as encompassed within the
negative right to health and suggests that those reasons should not continue
to hold sway.
Part II then briefly describes the recent decisions of the Canadian
Supreme Court in Chaoulli v. Québec 12 and of the South African
Constitutional Court in Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 13
and draws on those opinions to consider how one might more fully conceive
of a negative right to health—and of the abortion right as one aspect of that
negative health care right—within U.S. constitutional law. The right to
health in both cases is conceived as a right against government–mandated
harm, whether in the form of denial of or delay in access to medical
treatment. That harm, moreover, is broadly conceived to include physical,
emotional, and psychological harm. While not limitless, the negative right
to health is also a robust right against interference with the doctor–patient
relationship and the decision–making that arises from that relationship.
Finally, Part III discusses why this is a particularly promising way
of framing reproductive rights for the future. Specifically, Part III argues
that the negative right to health, which already exists in incipient form in
U.S. constitutional law, would be particularly useful for attacking certain
kinds of legislation limiting reproductive rights, such as misleading
informed consent laws, mandatory ultrasound requirements, prohibitions on
particular methods of abortion, and onerous administrative regulations
pertaining exclusively to abortion providers. 14 Moreover, it may provide a
means of garnering wider political support for abortion rights.
12

[2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.).

13

2002, (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (S. Afr.).

14

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to an informed consent statute requiring
women be told that in obtaining an abortion they are “terminat[ing] the life of a whole,
separate, unique, living human being”); Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft, 444
F.3d 502, 517-18 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming preliminary injunction against a state law
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I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN
ABORTION J URISPRUDENCE
The right to choose abortion is a multifaceted one, comprising
many different rights. Most famously, of course, the right to an abortion is
described as a right to privacy, which usually means a right to make certain
intensely personal, fundamental, and potentially life–changing decisions
without interference from the government. 15 It is also in part a right to
equality—a right that is essential in order for women to be able to pursue
their chosen life paths on the same terms as men, without fear of being
forced into unplanned and unwanted childbearing. 16 Finally, the right to
choose abortion is a right to bodily integrity: a right against being forced to
put one’s womb in the service of the state’s claimed interest in potential
life. 17
The right to abortion is also a health care right. It is a right to access
a particular medical procedure and a right to use that medical procedure to
protect one’s health from significant harm, even if that procedure terminates
a potential life. In fact, as explained in this Part, reproductive rights,
including the right to contraception, have long been conceived in this way.
The understanding of reproductive rights as health care rights, which has
long been present in reproductive rights jurisprudence, has been
downplayed by both courts and reproductive rights advocates in favor of a

regulating mifepristone (RU-486) but opining that the injunction may need modification);
Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 537, 557 (9th Cir. 2004) (mostly rejecting a
constitutional challenge to onerous statutory and administrative scheme governing abortion
providers); Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, 317 F.3d 357, 371 (4th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting a constitutional challenge to onerous administrative regulations governing abortion
providers).
15

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (“Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education . . . .
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under the compulsion of the State.”).
16

Id. at 856 (“The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive
lives.”).
17

Id. at 857 (describing the abortion right as being, in part, a right of “bodily
integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to
mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection”).
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rhetoric centered on personal autonomy, equality, and dignity. 18 This Part
explores the reasons why this strand of reproductive rights jurisprudence
has largely been lost or ignored and suggests that those reasons should not
continue to hold sway.
A. The Right to Health and the Medical Model of Abortion in Ear ly
Abortion J ur ispr udence
One strain that unquestionably runs through American abortion
jurisprudence is the notion that abortion is a health care decision, to be
made by the woman and her physician without government interference,
and therefore that the abortion right is in part a negative health care right.
This view of abortion may be labeled the “medical model” of abortion,
according to which abortion is seen simply as one among many surgical
procedures, whose appropriateness is to be determined in the same way that
the appropriateness of other medical interventions is determined—using
professional clinical judgment. 19 In the medical model of abortion, the
physician plays a central role, exercising at least as much power as the
woman to decide whether the abortion should be performed. Indeed,
according to the medical model, abortion restrictions may violate the
physician’s right to practice medicine as much as the woman’s right to
privacy and autonomy. 20 The medical model of abortion is thus the basis for
understanding reproductive rights as negative health care rights.
The predominance of the medical model of abortion is apparent in
Roe v. Wade, with its heavy reliance on medico–legal history. 21 The Court
in Roe, summing up its holding, emphatically stated that its decision
“vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment
18

See infra Parts I.A and I.B.

19

Of course, at least since the approval of the abortifacient mifepristone by the
FDA in 2000, abortion may be performed medically as well as surgically; even before the
approval of mifepristone, the cancer drug methotrexate was used by medical professionals to
induce abortions. See generally Malcolm Potts, Non-Surgical Abortion: Who’s for
Methotrexate?, 346 LANCET 655 (1995).
20

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1973) (discussing “the right of the
physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment”); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 193 (1973) (discussing “the physician’s right to practice his
profession”); Elizabeth Reilly, “The Jurisprudence of Doubt”: How the Premises of the
Supreme Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence Undermine Procreative Liberty, 14 J.L. & POL.
757, 774-77 (1998).
21

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 130–47.
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according to his professional judgment up to the points where important
state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention.” 22 Until the
point of viability, when the state’s interest in the fetus becomes compelling,
the Court explained, “the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently,
and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest
with the physician.” 23 The Court was not alone in viewing the issue in Roe
as, at least in part, an issue of medical decision–making autonomy. The
lawyers for Jane Roe began the substantive portion of their Supreme Court
brief with the heading, “The Right to Seek and Receive Medical Care for
the Protection of Health and Well–Being Is a Fundamental Personal Liberty
Recognized by Decisions of This Court.” 24 Thus, the plaintiffs asserted—in
what they must have viewed to be their strongest argument, given its
prominence in the brief—that “the personal right to care for one’s health is
a fundamental right.” 25 Simply put, the abortion restrictions at issue in Roe
were seen as “den[ying] Appellants . . . access to health care.” 26 Elsewhere,
the plaintiffs described this right even more broadly, as the “right to care for
and protect one’s health in the manner one deems best.” 27
Similarly, the Court in Doe v. Bolton, 28 the companion case to Roe
v. Wade, repeatedly compared the abortion procedure to other surgical
procedures, noting that the Georgia statute at issue in that case regulated
abortion in ways that were unimaginable for other surgeries, and underlined
the importance of the physician’s medical judgment in determining the
appropriateness of abortion in an individual case. 29 That medical judgment
22

Id. at 165–66.

23

Id. at 166 (emphasis added).

24

See Brief for Appellants at 94–98, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1971) (No. 70–
18), 1971 WL 128054; see also Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of
Medical Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 147, 171–72 (2006).
25

Brief for Appellants, supra note 24, at 95.

26

Id. at 98. The plaintiffs also noted that several medical organizations “draw no
distinction between abortion and other medical procedures.” Id.
27

Id. at 96 (emphasis added).

28

410 U.S. 179 (1973).

29

See, e.g., Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197 (“We are not cited to any other surgical
procedure made subject to committee approval as a matter of state criminal law.”); id. at 199
(“Again, no other voluntary medical or surgical procedure for which Georgia requires
confirmation by two other physicians has been cited to us. If a physician is licensed by the
State, he is recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment.”);
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was broadly conceived, moreover, including the physician’s ability to take
into account emotional, psychological, and even “familial” factors. Such an
inclusive understanding, the Court explained, “allows the physician the
room he needs to make his best medical judgment”; this exercise of
judgment “operates for the benefit, not the disadvantage, of the pregnant
woman.” 30 Therefore, as in Roe, the Court suggested that not only the
woman’s privacy rights but also “the physician’s right to practice his
profession” could be violated by certain kinds of abortion restrictions.31 But
of course, the flip side of the physician’s right to administer treatment was
“[t]he woman’s right to receive medical care in accordance with her
licensed physician’s best judgment.” 32
Even before Roe and Doe, however, the right to contraception was
viewed in part as a right to access medical treatment and protect one’s
health. Early state court cases involving challenges to contraceptive
prohibitions centered in large part on the lack of a health exception and the
right of women to protect themselves from pregnancies that could pose

cf. id. at 192 (noting that “where a particular operation is necessary for a patient’s physical or
mental health is a judgment that physicians are obviously called upon to make routinely
whenever surgery is considered”).
30

Id. at 192.

31

Id. at 193 (striking down the portion of a Georgia abortion statute requiring that
a hospital committee approve each individual abortion). The Court’s apotheosis of
physicians and their professional judgment in Doe is truly striking in some places. For
example, although it held the committee-approval requirement for abortions unconstitutional,
the Court nonetheless dismissed the possibility that the hospital committee would be guided
in its decisions by anything other than pure medical judgment, such as their personal
disapproval of extramarital sex:
The appellants’ suggestion is somewhat degrading to the conscientious
physician, particularly the obstetrician, whose professional activity is
concerned with the physical and mental welfare, the woes, the emotions,
and the concern of his female patients. He, perhaps more than anyone
else, is knowledgeable in this area of patient care, and he is aware of
human frailty, so-called ‘error,’ and needs. The good physician—despite
the presence of rascals in the medical profession, as in all others, we trust
that most physicians are ‘good’—will have sympathy and understanding
for the pregnant patient that probably are not exceeded by those who
participate in other areas of professional counseling.
Id.

at 196–97.
32

Id. at 197.
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severe threats. 33 Even in Griswold v. Connecticut, traces of the medical
view of reproductive rights are visible, for example, in the Court’s objection
to the way that the Connecticut contraceptives ban “operate[d] directly on
an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role in one
aspect of that relation.” 34 Thus, while cases such as Griswold, Roe, and Doe
were obviously the foundations for later reproductive rights jurisprudence
that places the abortion right in the context of privacy, personal decision–
making autonomy, and general bodily integrity, they contained another
undeniable strand: a conception of reproductive rights as negative health
care rights. 35
B. The Shift Away fr om the Medical Model of Abor tion
Although the conception of reproductive rights as negative health
care rights coexisted with many other rights–conceptions at the onset of the
abortion rights debate, this strand has largely been lost or ignored by later
courts and legal scholars. In part, the tendency to ignore the healthcare
aspect of abortion rights might be attributable to the harsh criticism to
which the medical view of abortion has been subjected. For example, many
feminist scholars have criticized the medical model of abortion presented by
decisions such as Roe and Doe for its tendency to place the abortion
decision primarily in the physician’s hands rather than the patient’s, as well
as for its emphasis on the centrality of professional medical judgment as
opposed to the woman’s individual personal and moral judgment. They
argue that Roe was at best incomplete and at worst reinforcing of gender
inequalities when it emphasized the medical aspects of abortion rather than
its importance in securing equal citizenship for women. 36 And in vesting
33

Connecticut was the site of one such battle. For a complete history, see Mary L.
Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court Before Griswold v.
Connecticut, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915, 921–27, 932–35 (1990).
34

381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (emphasis added).

35

See Part III.A, infra, for additional discussion.

36

See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 273–79
(1992) [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoning]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199–1200 (1992) (“The idea of the woman in control of her
destiny and her place in society was less prominent in the Roe decision itself, which coupled
with the rights of the pregnant woman the free exercise of her physician’s medical judgment.
The Roe decision might have been less of a storm center had it homed in more precisely on
the women’s equality dimension of the issue.” (footnotes omitted)).
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primary control over the abortion decision in the physician, rather than the
woman, such critics contend, the medical model of abortion simply
transfers authority over women’s bodies and choices from the state to the
physician while keeping the woman disempowered. Thus, some abortion
rights advocates in the 1960’s argued that even liberally reforming abortion
laws—for example, to permit abortions only for health reasons, but with
“health reasons” being generously defined—rather than repealing the
criminal abortion laws altogether, “would simply mean that (primarily
male) physicians would have wider latitude to make a decision that these
women believed was the business only of the pregnant woman. The
necessity of a doctor’s approval, even under reformed abortion laws,
reinforced the traditional role of the woman as dependent, without control
over her future.” 37
Perhaps most influentially, Professor Reva Siegel has described the
role of physicians in the early anti–abortion movement in America, and her
scholarship gives ample reason to distrust medical and physiological
rhetoric as it is used to justify restrictions on abortion. In her classic article
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection, Professor Siegel explains that
physicians who opposed abortion appropriated the language of women’s
health for their own ends, suggesting that interruption of pregnancy and,
more fundamentally, of women’s maternal destiny, was injurious to them
both physiologically and psychologically. 38 Moreover, those physicians
used physiological arguments to achieve the social end of maintaining
existing societal arrangements with respect to gender.39 Thus, “[m]en
interested in establishing their professional authority over women’s role in
reproduction encouraged other men [i.e., legislators] to assert their political
authority over women’s role in reproduction by criminalizing the means of
37
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 45 (1990); see also
KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 33 (1984) (noting that in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “physicians wanted to create a category of
‘justifiable’ abortion and to make themselves the custodians of it”); Siegel, Reasoning, supra
note 36, at 296 (describing how physicians’ rhetoric in the nineteenth century suggested that
“[t]he physician was to serve as his [female] patient’s ‘confessor’ and ‘physical guardian’”).
38
39

Siegel, Reasoning, supra note 36, at 293–97.

Id. at 299–314; cf. JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY 147–70 (1977) (documenting the physicians’ movement
against abortion in the nineteenth century and concluding that it was motivated in large part
by a desire to professionalize medicine, raise its status, and eliminate competition from
outsiders providing obstetric services, as well as by eugenic concerns and genuine moral
opposition to the practice).
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controlling birth, each acting to preserve life in the social order as they
knew it.” 40
Professor Siegel also documents the role that such physiological
arguments continue to play in both popular rhetoric and case law
concerning pregnancy, abortion, and fetal protection. 41 More recently, she
has connected gender–based physiological arguments to the rise of
“woman–protective” abortion legislation, such as the proposed 2006 South
Dakota abortion ban, which was justified in terms of protecting women
from the physical and mental health risks of abortion, while relying upon
and perpetuating stereotypes about women’s capacity and women’s proper
role in society. 42
Moreover, some recent scholarship suggests that physicians
continue to exercise inappropriate and excessive control in the reproductive
health context—for example, by valuing the fetus over the woman, whose
life and labor are virtually erased from contemporary debates about fetal
protection. 43 Professor Nancy Ehrenreich has persuasively demonstrated
that the “medical model of reproduction,” which creates the illusion of pure
objectivity in medicine, constructs a dichotomy whereby “medicine is seen
as a scientific endeavor in which nature is controlled through culture—
through active intervention by physicians. On the other hand, reproduction
(and the women in whose bodies it occurs) is seen as a pathological,
disease–like condition—the object that must be acted upon and controlled
in order to eliminate danger.” 44 Women are not, therefore, vital agents in
control of the process of reproduction but rather objects to be managed or
controlled. That view of reproduction, combined with a high moral and
40

Siegel, Reasoning, supra note 36, at 318.

41

Id. at 324-47.

42

Reva Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of WomanProtective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 [hereinafter Siegel, New Politics]
(discussing H.B. 1215, 2006 Leg., 81st Sess. (S.D. 2006) (repealed 2006)); cf. Reva Siegel,
Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117
YALE L.J. 1694, 1720–33 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Dignity] (discussing the recent strategy
of some abortion opponents of focusing on women’s health). In November 2008, a second
South Dakota initiative on abortion failed at the ballot box. See Tiffany Sharples, Ballot
Initiatives: No to Gay Marriage, Anti-Abortion Measures, TIME, Nov. 5, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1856820,00.html.
43
Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 505
(1993); Siegel, Reasoning, supra note 36, at 330 n.285.
44

Ehrenreich, supra note 43, at 538.
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social value placed on the fetus and societal expectations that women will
be self–sacrificing, is used to justify coercive measures, such as court–
ordered cesarean sections, when women resist their passive role. 45
Similarly, Professor Michelle Oberman has argued that in so–called
“maternal–fetal conflicts,” the doctor is presented as the wise and neutral
mediator, whereas in reality “[i]t is the doctor who identifies the course of
action deemed to be ‘in the fetus’s best interests,’” perhaps even viewing
the fetus as a “second patient,” thereby becoming a party to the conflict and
invariably “tip[ping] the balance . . . against the pregnant woman.” 46
Often, this understanding of medicine and its relation to
reproduction visits disproportionate burdens on poor and minority women,
against whom the state’s coercive power is most likely to be exercised in
the reproductive health context—as, indeed, in many other contexts.47 “[T]o
the extent that judges entertain any of the prevailing stereotypes of outsider
women [involved in maternal–fetal conflicts, for example,] their attitudes
make it that much easier for them to minimize the health and autonomy
interests of the women, while accepting the doctors’ assessments as
accurate.” 48 Indeed, a substantial body of literature in the fields of medicine,
ethics, and social science indicates the failure of the current structure of
informed consent law and other aspects of the health care system in general
to guarantee dignified, high–quality medical treatment to minority patients,
due to a failure to take important cultural factors into account when
communicating medical information.49
Finally, it is perhaps relevant that, despite the medical language of
Roe and Doe, the Supreme Court has generally treated contraception and
abortion, in cases claiming a right to access that particular medical
procedure, differently from most other claims of right to access medical
treatment. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the important
45

Id. at 564 (“Viewing the process as pathological, seeking to minimize risks to
the fetus at all costs, and assuming that mothers are, and should be, self-sacrificing, [doctors]
base their ‘scientific’ judgments on contested factual assumptions and value choices.”).
46

Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s
Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U.L. REV. 451, 454–55, 471–78 (2000).
47

Ehrenreich, supra note 43, at 519–30.

48
Id. at 565. Professor Ehrenreich nonetheless documents the way in which
privileged women, too, are subtly subordinated by medical discourse and medical authority.
Id. at 530–32.
49
Dayna Bowen Matthew, Race, Religion, and Informed Consent—Lessons from
Social Science, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 150, 150, 156–60 (2008).
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constitutional right at stake in the cases touching on contraception and
abortion by applying heightened scrutiny and a non–deferential stance to
the government’s view of the medical facts, but most other cases dealing
with plaintiffs’ claims of a right to access a particular medical treatment are
treated quite differently. When patients seek to access cannabis or
unapproved experimental drugs, for example, their claims of a right to
protect their health and access appropriate medical treatment are quickly
dismissed, with courts applying little scrutiny and sweeping deference to
the government’s view. 50 Because reproductive rights–related autonomy
claims receive more careful consideration from courts than claims of a right
to access other medical interventions, it is not surprising that feminist
scholars and other commentators have tended to view reproductive rights as
distinct from, and unrelated to, other health–care issues in constitutional
doctrine.
Thus, by the time of its 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 51 the Supreme Court had clearly moved away from the medical
model of abortion and the associated primacy of the physician’s judgment
and role. Indeed, in Casey, the Court went so far as to assert that, not only
was the doctor–patient relationship not entitled to any special solicitude in
the abortion context, but “[w]hatever constitutional status the doctor–patient
relation may have as a general matter, in the present context it is derivative
of the woman’s position.” 52 It continued, “[t]he doctor–patient relation does
not underlie or override the two more general rights under which the
abortion right is justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to
physical autonomy.” 53
C. Cr itiquing the Cr itiques of the Medical Model
The feminist critiques of the medical model of abortion are, no
doubt, both valid and compelling. Without, therefore, intending to minimize
them, this Article suggests that these critiques may be based in part on a
historical view of medicine as male dominated and uninterested in women’s
autonomy that is no longer entirely accurate but that continues to exert a
50
The argument made in this paragraph is set forth at greater length in B. Jessie
Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two
Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277 (2007).
51

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

52

Id. at 884.

53

Id.
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somewhat excessive influence on reproductive rights scholarship and legal
practice. Indeed, it may be time to revive the latent strand of reproductive
rights jurisprudence that envisions abortion as a medical procedure among
others and vindicates a form of negative right to health.
One reason for rejecting, or at least sidelining, the criticisms of the
medical model of abortion is that it is based in part on a state of affairs that
no longer exists. Although it may have been reasonable to describe
medicine as predominantly male 54 until fairly recently, or to assert that
abortion politics were about “[m]en interested in establishing their
professional authority over women’s role in reproduction encourag[ing]
other men to assert their political authority over women’s role in
reproduction,” 55 statistics now indicate that women have been entering the
field of obstetrics and gynecology at a substantially higher rate than men for
several years. 56
More importantly, critics’ concerns about women’s autonomy and
empowerment within the physician–patient relationship may now be
overstated, given the tremendous changes in professional beliefs, attitudes,
and orientation toward patient autonomy that has been driven largely by the
discipline of bioethics. Indeed, the era in which Roe was decided, the 1970s,
was precisely the era in which patient autonomy became a primary focus of
medical ethics. 57 This is not to suggest that concerns about women’s
autonomy in the doctor–patient relationship have disappeared entirely;
those concerns certainly persist, and they are particularly acute with respect
to poor and minority women. 58 But it does seem fair to point out that there
is now an entire field of study known as bioethics—influential in both legal
54

Ehrenreich, supra note 43, at 538.

55

Siegel, supra note 36, at 318.

56

See, e.g., Susan E. Gerber & Anthony T. Lo Sasso, The Evolving Gender Gap in
General Obstetrics and Gynecology, 195 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1427, 1427
(2006) (noting that the proportion of women obstetrics and gynecology (ob-gyn) residents
rose from forty-four percent in 1989 to seventy-four percent in 2002).
57
See, e.g., Robert M. Veatch, Autonomy’s Temporary Triumph, 14 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 38, 38 (Oct. 1984).
58

See, e.g., ALEXANDRA DUNDAS TODD, INTIMATE ADVERSARIES: CULTURAL
CONFLICT BETWEEN DOCTORS AND WOMEN PATIENTS 77–97 (1989); Khiara H. Bridges,
Quasi-Colonial Bodies: An Analysis of the Reproductive Lives of Poor Black and Racially
Subjugated Women, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. PAGE (2009); Ehrenreich, supra note 43;
Oberman, supra note 46; cf. Veatch, supra note 57, at 39 (acknowledging the limitations of
the concept of patient autonomy for addressing concerns about equality in health care).
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and medical education and discourse—that is largely centered on increasing
respect for patient autonomy and encouraging informed decision–making. 59
That field has largely grown as an academic discipline in the years since
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. 60 It is worth recalling as well that the
American Medical Association (AMA), which had in the past been a
prominent force in achieving the criminalization of abortion, now supports
abortion rights. 61 The AMA even filed an amicus curiae brief in the
Supreme Court on behalf of Planned Parenthood in Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern New England, 62 which involved a federal
constitutional challenge to a state law requiring parental notification for
minors seeking abortions. 63 In other words, the medical profession is not the
same male–dominated, patriarchal, and paternalistic profession it was in the
nineteenth century; bioethics, feminism, and the increased entry of women
into the profession have changed and continue to change the way both
patients and physicians approach the medical decision–making process. To
the extent that challenges remain, there is no reason to believe that the same
59

See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 57–112 (5th ed. 2001); Carl Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 411, 413 (2006) (describing the centrality of patient autonomy to bioethics
and stating that “[b]ioethics was born a reform movement” with “medical imperialism” as its
enemy).
60

The Hastings Center, one of the most important and well-respected bioethics
research centers in the United States, was founded in 1969, and the Kennedy Institute of
Ethics at Georgetown University, which bills itself as “the world’s oldest and most
comprehensive academic bioethics center” was founded in 1971. See The Kennedy Institute
of Ethics, http://kennedyinstitute.georgetown.edu/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2009); The Hastings
Center, http://www.thehastingscenter.org/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2009). Beauchamp and
Childress’s seminal bioethics text was first published in 1979. See TOM. L. BEAUCHAMP &
JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (1st. Ed. 1979).
61

For a history of the American Medical Association’s opposition to abortion, see
Siegel, Reasoning, supra note 36, at 285–86. For the AMA’s current position on abortion,
see Brief for American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320
(2006) (No. 04-1144), 2005 WL 2646471, at 2 (noting that the AMA does not “support or
oppose abortion” but “believe[s] that this issue is a matter for physicians to decide
individually, based on personal values and beliefs” and supports the “integrity and
confidentiality of the patient/physician relationship and the ethical duty of physicians to
respect and advocate for their patients’ personal autonomy”).
62

546 U.S. 320 (2006).

63
Brief for American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 61.
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tools that have been used to transform the profession until now are no
longer up to the task.
It may therefore be time to return to some of the premises from
which reproductive rights jurisprudence began; in particular, it may be time
to consider whether the right to choose abortion might, in part, be
understood as an aspect of a constitutional right to make medical treatment
decisions in consultation with a physician. Although such a right is not
currently firmly or explicitly recognized in American constitutional
doctrine, Part III of this Article argues that, reading between the lines, there
is clear precedent for recognizing its existence as an aspect of substantive
due process. 64 The cases discussed next, in Part II, may provide useful
models for understanding how such a right might be understood.
II. REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH:
EXAMPLES FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND CANADA
This Part describes two decisions by the highest courts of South
Africa and Canada and considers how the right to health is understood by
each, as well as how such a right, which has largely been discussed outside
the abortion context, can apply to abortion. These two cases provide
particularly interesting and useful examples for thinking about the right to
health for several reasons. First, they are noteworthy in that, although both
decisions come from countries that grant substantially broader health care
entitlements to their citizens than the U.S., these cases largely embrace the
negative concept of a right against government interference with
autonomous medical treatment decisions, rather than the positive concept of
a right to subsidized medical services. They are thus more easily
assimilated to U.S. constitutional jurisprudence than decisions establishing
a positive right might be. 65 Moreover, both courts rely on a concept of the
64

See infra Part III.A.; see also Hill, supra note 50, at 329–32 (discussing the wide
variety of cases in which courts have held or assumed that individuals have a constitutional
right to protect their health in the form of a “substantive-due-process right to make medical
decisions without unwarranted government interference”).
65
This Article emphasizes the negative quality of the health care rights recognized
in the Canadian and South African cases because it is incontrovertible that courts in the
United States are extremely unlikely to recognize a positive constitutional right to access
health care services in the near future. U.S. constitutional law has never recognized
constitutional rights as positive rights, and any move toward positive rights in the near future
is virtually impossible to imagine. See, e.g., Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, supra note 9, at
1392–94. This Article does not argue that abortion rights should be understood as an aspect
of the human right to health contained in instruments of international law, as others have
argued. See generally supra note 2; Soohoo & Stolz, supra note 3, at 479–98 (arguing that
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right to health that is related to, and includes, the right to access abortion.
As such, they demonstrate how a negative right to health that includes a
right to access abortion might be conceptualized. Finally, both cases are
recent cases that garnered substantial attention both in their countries of
origin and in the United States. As such, they may represent rising trends in
judicial thinking about health care and the nature of health care rights.66
Both South Africa and Canada have recognized in some form a
“right to health” in ways that bear partly, though not exclusively, on the
abortion right. South Africa has explicitly guaranteed a constitutional right
to health that is understood, at least in part, as a positive entitlement to
health care, including reproductive health services. Canada, on the other
hand, has not gone so far as to recognize a positive constitutional right to
health care. 67 In the recent case of Chaoulli v. Québec, however, various
Justices read both the Charter of the province of Québec and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms to guarantee a negative right to
noninterference with an individual’s access to health care services. 68 The
right identified by the Court in the Québec Charter has a strong affiliation to
the right of personal security in the Canadian Charter on which Regina v.
Morgentaler, 69 the original Canadian decision recognizing a constitutional
advocates can use human rights, including the right to health, to support domestic change in
the reproductive rights arena). Rather, this Article argues that courts can recognize, and to
some extent already have recognized, a negative right to noninterference in medical
treatment decisions. See infra Part III.A; Hill, supra note 50, at 329–32. This Article
contends, moreover, that abortion rights may be placed usefully within that framework.
Some commentators nonetheless maintain that a positive right to health care can and should
be recognized in the United States. See, e.g., Jennifer Prah Ruger, Governing Health, 121
HARV. L. REV. F. 43, 44 (2008) (arguing that “a right to health care need not, indeed cannot,
be framed in an absolute libertarian framework of wholly individualistic rights against the
State” but rather must include a conception of obligation on the part of both state and nonstate actors to help furnish the necessary public good of health care).
66
See generally Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J.
487, 491–97 (2005) (discussing transnational dialogue among courts as a cooperative and
synergistic enterprise).
67

The Canada Health Act, which provides federal funding for comprehensive
universal health care to be administered by the provinces, constitutes a positive statutory
right to health care, however. Canada Health Act, R.S.C., c. C-6, s. 7 (1985). See generally
Puneet K. Sandhu, Comment, A Legal Right to Health Care: What Can the United States
Learn from Foreign Models of Health Rights Jurisprudence?, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1181–
82 (2007).
68

Chaoulli v. Québec, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.).

69

[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.).
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right to choose abortion, was founded. The negative right to health
recognized in South Africa and Canada is thus reminiscent of the medical
model within American reproductive rights jurisprudence. It may therefore
be fruitful to consider the South African and Canadian cases in greater
depth in order to see how an incipient negative healthcare right in American
constitutional law could be further developed and applied to abortion rights.
A. Minister of Health v. Tr eatment Action Campaign
Section 27 of the South African Bill of Rights explicitly guarantees
a “right to have access to . . . health care services, including reproductive
health care.” 70 A fair amount of recent scholarship has focused on South
Africa’s enforcement of the right to health, among others, as positive rights,
which impose affirmative duties on the government to take reasonable
measures to achieve them for all citizens equally. 71 As discussed below,
however, this Article focuses on the right to health as it is elaborated on in
one particular case decided by the South African Constitutional Court,
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), 72 in which the
right to health shares many of the characteristics of a negative right to
noninterference with medical treatment decisions.
The TAC decision dealt with access to an antiretroviral drug,
Nevirapine, which had been approved in South Africa as safe and effective
to prevent transmission of HIV from HIV–positive mothers to their babies
during childbirth. 73 The South African government had made the drug
available to women in the public health sector on a very limited basis,
permitting only two test sites per province to administer it. 74 According to
the government, the decision to limit the availability of Nevirapine was
largely due to concerns about the complexity of providing the drug in the
70

S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 27.

71

See, e.g., Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: SocioEconomic Rights and the South African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
321 (2007); Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the
Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
351 (2008); Mitra Ebadolahi, Note, Using Structural Interdicts and the South African
Human Rights Commission to Achieve Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights
in South Africa, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1565 (2008).
72

2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (S. Afr.).

73

Id. ¶ 10.

74

Id.
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context of a comprehensive treatment and prevention plan for HIV–positive
mothers and their newborns. In particular, the government was concerned
that the efficacy of the treatment could be undermined by multiple social,
economic, and cultural factors, such as the necessity of counseling and
follow–up care, the expense of providing infant formula to HIV–positive
mothers, the difficulty of persuading women to substitute that formula for
breastfeeding, and the absence of clean water in certain parts of the country,
which would make formula feeding riskier.75 The government also argued
that it was concerned about the safety and efficacy of the drug as well as
about the possibility of resistance to the drug developing in the HIV–
positive mothers. 76 Unmentioned in the opinion, however, is the fact that
the South African government’s reluctance to provide access to Nevirapine
was part of a larger program of heel–dragging in providing a nationwide
treatment plan for HIV/AIDS, motivated by a well–known skepticism about
the relationship between HIV and AIDS on the part of President Thabo
Mbeki’s administration. 77
The plaintiffs successfully brought suit against the Minister of
Health and various other health officials to attain universal access to
Nevirapine within the public health care system, 78 arguing that the South
African Constitution required the government to make the drug available
“where in the judgment of the attending medical practitioner this is
medically indicated,” and that the drug may be beneficial even when it is
not administered in the context of a comprehensive plan. 79 They relied both

75

Id. ¶¶ 14–16; see also id. ¶¶ 51–54. The government presented evidence
suggesting that some infants who are HIV-negative at birth become HIV-positive afterwards,
possibly as a result of breastfeeding by the HIV-positive mother. Id. ¶ 58.
76

Id. ¶¶ 52–53.

77
The depths of the government’s intransigence, and its roots, are fascinatingly
recounted in William E. Forbath, Realizing a Constitutional Social Right—Cultural
Transformation, Deep Institutional Reform, and the Roles of Advocacy and Adjudication, in
STONES OF HOPE: AFRICAN LAWYERS USE HUMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY
(Jeremy Perelman and Lucie White eds., forthcoming 2010) (manuscript on file with author);
see also Mark Heywood, Shaping, Making, and Breaking the Law in the Campaign for a
National HIV/AIDS Treatment Plan, in DEMOCRATISING DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICS OF
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA (Peris Jones & Kristian Stokke eds., 2005).
78
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC)
¶¶ 18–19 (S. Afr.).
79

Id. ¶ 18 (discussing Affidavit submitted by activists from the Treatment Action
Campaign). Indeed, the Constitutional Court noted that “the wealth of scientific material
produced by both sides makes plain that sero-conversion of HIV takes place in some, but not
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on the right to health contained in Section 27 of the constitution and on
Section 28, which guarantees children the right to certain basic goods,
including basic health care.80
Although the plaintiffs’ claim for enforcement of the right to health
was styled as a claim of positive right, 81 it shared many characteristics of a
negative right. First, the drug had been offered to the government free of
charge for a period of five years. Thus, “the cost of the drug itself was not a
factor” in the government’s decision to deny access. 82 Second, the
Constitutional Court relied in part on the notion that the constitution
imposes, “at the very least, a negative obligation placed upon the State and
all other entities and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the right
of access” to “health care services, including reproductive health care.”83 At
issue in TAC was not so much the government’s affirmative obligation to
provide a drug to those dependent on the public health care system as much
as its obligation not to interfere with patients’ access to that drug. 84
The contours of a negative right to health, consisting of a right to be
free from government–imposed harm and to maintain a broad range of
discretion for medical decision making by physicians and their patients,
thus emerge from the TAC decision. While accepting the government’s
all, cases and that nevirapine thus remains to some extent efficacious in combating motherto-child transmission even if the mother breastfeeds her baby.” Id. ¶ 58.
80

Id. ¶ 4 (citing S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2 §§ 27(1)(a), 28(1)(c)).

81

Cf. id. ¶ 39 (noting that the right to health in Section 27(1) of the South African
Constitution is a right “to have ‘access’ to the services the state is obliged to provide,” which
is limited by the reasonableness standard explicitly set forth in Section 27(2)). Professor
William Forbath notes that the case was designed to vindicate a positive constitutional right,
although it the plaintiffs could achieve victory if the court only recognized a negative right,
which is precisely what the lower court did. Forbath, supra note 77, manuscript at 12.
82

Treatment Action Campaign, (10) BCLR ¶ 48.

83

Id. ¶ 46 (quoting Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom,
2001 (1) SA 46, ¶ 34 (CC) (S. Afr.)); cf. Sandhu, supra note 67, at 1175 noting that the
South African right to health is both a negative and a positive right); Tushnet, supra note 5,
at 1902–08 (classifying the South African right to health as either a strong or a weak
substantive right, depending on the case); see also Paul Nolette, Lessons Learned from the
South African Constitutional Court: Toward a Third Way of Judicial Enforcement of SocioEconomic Rights, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 91, 107, 118 (2003) (characterizing the socioeconomic rights in the South African Constitution as “rights of access,” as opposed to “rights
on demand,” and suggesting that they represent a “third way” between strong positive rights
and a complete absence of positive rights).
84

See Forbath, supra note 77, manuscript at 22.
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view that parents were primarily responsible for affording health care to
their children where possible, for instance, the Court emphasized that in this
case, the government’s own “rigid and inflexible” policy was responsible
for harming the affected children and placing their rights “in peril.” 85 In
other words, the state, at the very minimum, has an obligation not to harm
its citizens through its health care policies. The Court also declined to defer
to the government’s rather questionable view of the medical facts
concerning the safety and efficacy of the drug in these particular
circumstances, insisting that the medically appropriate course “must be left
to health professionals to address during counseling.” 86 Thus, in language
suggestive of a right to noninterference with medical treatment decisions,
the government was ordered to, inter alia, “[r]emove the restrictions that
prevent [N]evirapine from being made available for the purpose of reducing
the risk of mother–to–child transmission of HIV at public hospitals and
clinics that are not research and training sites,” as well as to both “permit”
and “facilitate the use of [N]evirapine . . . when in the judgment of the
attending medical practitioner . . . this is medically indicated.” 87
B. Chaoulli v. Québec

1. The Chaoulli Decision
Though it arose in a very different context, the Canadian Supreme
Court’s decision in Chaoulli v. Québec bears many similarities to the TAC
decision with respect to the right to health. In Chaoulli v. Québec, 88 the
Court held that the province of Québec could not constitutionally prohibit
private health insurance without running afoul of patients’ rights to physical
inviolability. The plaintiffs, a physician and a patient, had challenged the
constitutionality of a Québec law that prohibited Québec residents from
taking out insurance to pay for health services in the private sector if those
same services were available through Québec’s public health plan.89
85

Treatment Action Campaign, (10) BCLR ¶ 78.

86

Id. ¶ 128. Similarly, the plaintiffs argued that “[w]hether or not to prescribe
Nevirapine is a matter of professional medical judgment, which can only be exercised on a
case-by-case basis. It is not a matter which is capable of rational or appropriate decision on a
blanket basis.” Id. ¶ 19.
87

Id. ¶¶ 135(a), (b) (emphasis added).
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[2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.).
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Id. ¶¶ 1, 5.
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Although the provincial government claimed that the prohibition was
necessary in order to preserve the viability of the publicly financed
universal health care system in Québec, the Court nonetheless held the law
unconstitutional in a 4-3 opinion. 90
No single rationale commanded a majority of the Court. The lead
opinion by Justice Deschamps relied upon Section 1 of the Québec Charter
to find the prohibition unconstitutional and therefore did not reach the
question whether the prohibition was unconstitutional under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well. 91 Chief Justice MacLachlin, in a
concurring opinion, agreed that the Québec law violated the Québec Charter
but also relied upon Section 7 of the Canadian Charter, which protects
Canadians’ “right to life, liberty and security of the person.” 92
The two opinions in the majority shared several commonalities,
however. Although not explicitly presented in terms of a right to health,
both opinions viewed the prohibition on private insurance as a form of
state–mandated harm that impermissibly interferes with the individuals’
rights to protect their health and life—broadly construed—through medical
treatment. Justice Deschamps reasoned that the personal “inviolability”
protected by Section 1 of the Québec Charter included “physical
inviolability and mental or psychological inviolability,” 93 and that both of
these were violated by the prohibition, because the long delays resulting
from the lack of access to private sector health services led to injuries
ranging from increased risk of morbidity or death, to severe pain, to a loss
of quality of life.94 Similarly, Chief Justice MacLachlin stated that the
Québec prohibition “results in physical and psychological suffering”
90

Id. ¶¶ 23–24, 100–104.

91

Id. ¶ 15; see also QUÉBEC CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS & FREEDOMS, R.S.Q., ch.
C-12 § 1 (1977) (Can.) (“Every human being has a right to life, and to personal security,
inviolability and freedom.”) [hereinafter QUÉBEC CHARTER].
92

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982,
ch. 11 § 7 (U.K.); Chaoulli, S.C.R. ¶¶ 102, 104.
93
In the French version, the word for inviolability is “integrité,” which may also
be translated as “integrity.” Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, L.R.Q., ch. C-12 § 1
(1977) (“Tout être humain a droit à la vie, ainsi qu’à la sûreté, à l’intégrité et à la liberté de
sa personne.”).
94

Chaoulli, S.C.R. ¶¶ 41–43. Justice Deschamps also concluded that the
prohibition could not be justified by section 9.1 of the Québec Charter, which permits limits
on individual rights and freedoms in the interest of “democratic values, public order and the
general well-being of the citizens of Québec.” QUÉBEC CHARTER, R.S.Q., ch. C-12 § 9.1.
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through increased delays in accessing health care and increased health risks,
thus violating the Section 7 right to “security of the person.” 95 He added
that “[t]he state has effectively limited access to private health care except
for the very rich, who can afford private sector care without need of
insurance.” 96 Both opinions, then, relied upon a negative right against state–
imposed harm to health through denial of, or delay in, access to medical
services as a violation of the right to personal security or inviolability, and
both understood the concept of harm to health broadly, to include non–
trivial mental or psychological harm. 97
Justices Binnie and Lebel, writing in dissent, disagreed with the
majority’s holding, but the disagreement was not so fundamental as it might
at first appear. 98 Although the dissenting Justices felt that the Québec law,
as a whole, did not violate principles of fundamental justice under the
Canadian Charter, even they acknowledged two ways that the Section 7
right to personal security may be implicated: first, if “the public system fails
to deliver life–saving care and an individual is simultaneously prevented
from seeking insurance to cover the cost of that care in a private facility,”
and second, if an individual’s medical condition will deteriorate due to a
“lack of timely medical intervention” for which the state is responsible. 99
The dissent expressed discomfort with deciding the issue on the basis of a
record that was somewhat sparse and abstract, however: for example,
neither of the plaintiffs was an individual actually suffering from a medical
problem that required immediate treatment, so the effects of the law could
not be concretely evaluated. 100 In light of this fact, the dissent declined to
“foreclose individual patients from seeking individual relief” as plaintiffs
alleging a violation of their Section 7 rights by the Quebec law.101 But they
95

Chaoulli, S.C.R. ¶ 123.

96

Id. ¶ 106.

97

Indeed, Justice Deschamps apparently would include “moral” harm as well. Id.

98

Chaoulli, S.C.R. ¶ 203.

99

Id. ¶¶ 203, 206.

at ¶ 41.

100

Id. ¶¶ 207, 224 (“One of the difficulties in assessing the effectiveness . . . [of
the Québec system] is that neither [of the plaintiffs] is before the Court with an actual
medical problem.”).
101

Id. ¶ 264 (“Judicial intervention at this level on a case-by-case basis is
preferable to acceptance of the appellants’ global challenge to the entire single-tier health
plan. It is important to emphasize that rejection of the appellants’ global challenge to
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deemed a global challenge to the law—what might in U.S. law be termed a
facial challenge—to be inappropriate in the current circumstances. Even the
dissent in Chaoulli, then, assumed that some right to protect one’s health
both existed and might be violated by the private health insurance
prohibition. 102
2. Chaoulli and the Right to Access Abortion
Both majority opinions in Chaoulli drew on the Canadian Supreme
Court’s decision in Regina v. Morgentaler 103—the case that first struck
down a criminal prohibition on abortions under the Canadian Charter—in
order to flesh out its reasoning regarding the unconstitutionality, under
Section 7, of denying access to a medically indicated procedure in such a
way as to cause serious physical or psychological harm. For example, in
demonstrating that the Québec law did not comport with fundamental
justice, Chief Justice MacLachlin noted that “rules that endanger health
arbitrarily do not comply with the principles of fundamental justice,” citing
Morgentaler as an example of a case in which “the rule against arbitrariness
may be implicated in the particular context of access to health care.” 104 She
also cited Morgentaler for the proposition that “delays in obtaining medical
treatment which affect patients physically and psychologically trigger the
protection of Section 7 of the Charter.” 105 Justice Deschamps’s opinion
Québec’s health plan would not foreclose individual patients from seeking individual relief
tailored to their individual circumstances.”). Interestingly, the approach taken by the
majority in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), is similar to that advocated by the
dissent in Chaoulli. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 162–68 (holding that medical issues could not
properly be resolved in the context of a facial challenge to the federal Partial Birth Abortion
Ban Act but leaving the door open to an as-applied challenge).
102

The Chaoulli decision has been heavily criticized for its holding, and
particularly for the likely harmful effects of that decision on the Canadian public health care
system and Canadian health policy. See, e.g., Joan M. Gilmour, Fallout from Chaoulli: Is It
Time to Find Cover?, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 327 (2006); Martha Jackman, The Last Line of
Defence for [Which?] Citizens?: Accountability, Equality, and the Right to Health in
Chaoulli, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 349, 363–72 (2006). This Article expresses no opinion as
to the wisdom of that holding in the Canadian context or its broader implications. Rather,
this Article seeks to mine the opinion for its perspective on the meaning of a negative right to
health, which, despite its potentially undesirable effects in Canada, would fit comfortably
within U.S. constitutional law and the already privatized U.S. health care system.
103

[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.).

104

Chaoulli, S.C.R. ¶ 133.

105

Id. ¶ 118.
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similarly relied on Morgentaler for the notion that state–caused delays in
access to health care must be understood to implicate the right to personal
inviolability, regardless of whether the resulting harm is mental or
physical. 106
Indeed, in Morgentaler itself, the lead opinion described at length
the problematic effects of the delays experienced by women seeking
therapeutic abortions, including the greater risk of complications that
accompany later abortions and the accompanying psychological and
emotional distress. This possibility of physical and emotional distress
imposed by the state’s bureaucracy led Chief Justice Dickson and Justice
Lamer to conclude that “in the case of abortion the implications of any
delay . . . are potentially devastating.” 107 The concurring opinion of Justice
Beetz, while less focused specifically on delay, was even more explicit in
drawing a connection between the right to access therapeutic abortion and
the right to government noninterference in health care decisions:
Generally speaking, the constitutional right to security of the
person must include some protection from state interference
when a person’s life or health is in danger . . . . If a rule of
criminal law precludes a person from obtaining appropriate
medical treatment when his or her life or health is in danger, then
the state has intervened and this intervention constitutes a
violation of that man’s or that woman’s security of the person.
“Security of the person” must include a right of access to medical
treatment for a condition representing a danger to life or health
108
without fear of criminal sanction.

The connection between reproductive rights and a negative right to
protect one’s health is thus explicit in Morgentaler. 109 Chaoulli highlights
this strand of the Morgantaler opinion and further suggests ways in which it
may be applicable to reproductive rights.
106
Id. ¶ 43; cf. Rodriguez v. Attorney General, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, ¶ 21 (Can.)
(“[T]he judgments of this Court in Morgentaler can be seen to encompass a notion of
personal autonomy involving, at the very least, control over one’s bodily integrity free from
state interference and freedom from state-imposed psychological and emotional stress.”).
107

Morgentaler, S.C.R. ¶ 58.

108

Id. ¶ 90.

109
Cf. Joanna N. Erdman, In the Back Alleys of Health Care: Abortion, Equality,
and Community in Canada, 56 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1105–06 (2007) (noting that Morgentaler,
in contrast to Roe v. Wade, relied not on a liberty interest but on the right to security of the
person to hold the criminal abortion prohibitions unconstitutional).
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B. Summar y: Modeling a Right to Health
Both the South African Constitutional Court’s decision in TAC and
the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Chaoulli v. Québec outline a
right to health that may be described more precisely as a right to
noninterference by the government with individuals’ access to appropriate
health care. These cases and their reasoning are described here in the hope
that they may provide models for conceptualizing such a right within
American substantive due process jurisprudence, which may include the
right to access reproductive health services. To that end, this Section briefly
summarizes the key aspects of the health care rights elaborated in TAC and
Chaoulli.
First, and fundamentally, the health care rights in TAC and Chaoulli
may be conceptualized as negative rights to freedom from government
interference and not as potentially more problematic positive
socioeconomic rights to access particular public goods. They are thus
distinct from the sort of government entitlements that some scholars
advocate and that some hope to enforce through international human rights
mechanisms. 110 As negative rights, they may fit within the general
framework of U.S. constitutional law. They therefore escape the criticisms
commonly leveled at positive rights. For example, negative rights do not
require courts to interfere with legislatively determined budget priorities,
nor do they raise difficult enforcement issues or the specter of inter-branch
warfare. 111 Compared with robust positive rights, negative rights may be
vindicated on the cheap.
In addition, TAC and Chaoulli both suggest, in broad strokes, how
one might describe and operationalize such a negative healthcare right. In
both cases, the right at issue is broadly conceived as a right to be free from
state–imposed harm, including harm resulting from administrative and
bureaucratic regulations that pose obstacles to obtaining medically
appropriate care. The Canadian case, in particular, emphasizes the

110

See generally Tamara Friesen, The Right to Health Care, 9 HEALTH L.J. 205
(2001); Erika R. George, Virginity Testing and South Africa’s HIV/AIDS Crisis: Beyond
Rights Universalism and Cultural Relativism Toward Health Capabilities, 96 CAL. L. REV.
1447, 1500–13 (2008) (discussing possibilities for enforcement of both the international and
South African positive right to health and its possible application to the problem of virginity
testing); Klein, supra note 71, at 352 (arguing that some judicial enforcement of positive
socio-economic rights is both possible and desirable); Ruger, supra note 65. .
111
See generally Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1895–97 (briefly summarizing the
principal objections to positive rights among American constitutional law scholars).
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phenomenon of state–caused delay in obtaining health services as an injury
in itself. 112
Both cases also conceive of health care broadly. The Canadian case
explicitly requires access to health care as a protection against significant
state–imposed mental, emotional, and psychological harm, as well as
physical harm. 113 Because TAC involved a concrete case of physical
suffering, it unsurprisingly focused on physical, rather than psychological,
harm. Still, the South African case does suggest a large role for physician
discretion, rather than “inflexible” state mandates, to determine precisely
what sort of medical care is indicated.114 In both cases, the broad
understanding of health and medical appropriateness was accompanied by a
disinclination to defer to the government’s view of the medical facts. This
left a bigger role for physicians and patients to determine the nature, scope,
and necessity of the medical intervention. 115
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both cases recognize a
connection between the negative right to health and reproductive rights. The
South African case arose in the context of delivering reproductive health
services, specifically, treatment to avoid HIV transmission from mother to
infant during childbirth. Moreover, the Court relied upon a constitutional
provision that explicitly includes reproductive health care within the scope
of the right to health care.116 Chaoulli, by contrast, arose in a context that
appears to be very much removed from reproductive rights, namely, a
general provincial prohibition on private health insurance for most medical
services. Yet, Chaoulli simultaneously drew on the Canadian Supreme
112

Chaoulli v. Quebec, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 ¶¶ 43, 118 (Can.); cf. Morgentaler,
S.C.R. ¶¶ 28–34; see also Erdman, supra note 109, at 1106–15.
113
But see Erdman, supra note 109, at 1141–48 (suggesting that some Canadian
provinces have embraced too narrow a conception of medical necessity with respect to
funding abortion).
114
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC)
¶ 128 (S. Afr.) (stating that the necessity of formula feeding in any particular case where
Nevirapine is administered “must be left to health professionals to address during
counseling”); id. ¶ 135(3)(b) (ordering the government to “make [Nevirapine] available . . .
at hospitals and clinics when in the judgment of the attending medical practitioner acting in
consultation with the medical superintendent of the facility concerned this is medically
indicated”).
115

Id. ¶¶ 57-66; Chaoulli, ¶¶ 85–98; cf. Hill, supra note 50, at 332–41 (arguing
that deference to legislatures is inappropriate where medical or scientific facts are
concerned).
116

S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 27(1).
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Court’s reasoning in Regina v. Morgentaler to describe the contours of the
right at issue in that case.117 Thus, reproductive rights in many ways fit
comfortably under the rubric of the negative health care right described
herein. The right to access abortion is clearly one aspect of the negative
right to health. 118
Of course, a right to health care, even a negative one, cannot be
unlimited, and it is not unlimited under the Canadian Charter or South
African Constitution. Rather, both constitutions contain provisions that limit
the extent of individual rights. The Section 7 right to security of the person
may be limited in ways that accord with “the principles of fundamental
justice.” 119 This provision has been understood as requiring balancing the
interests of the individual and the state.120 Similarly, the South African
Constitutional Court has made it clear that health care rights are limited by
reasonableness considerations. 121 Nonetheless, both countries recognize a
relatively robust constitutional right to access medical treatment, at least
when such a right does not place significant claims on government financial
resources. Such a constitutional right is broad enough in both countries to
encompass a right to reproductive health care.
117

Chaoulli, ¶ ¶43, 118.

118
Cf. John A. Robertson, Controversial Medical Treatment and the Right to
Health Care, 36 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 15, 15 (2006) (arguing that a negative right to health
care “anchors a woman’s use of abortion and contraception, and underlies the great
deference ordinarily accorded doctors and patients to pursue medical care”). But cf. Erdman,
supra note 109, at 1093 (2007) (asserting that under Canadian law, “[a]bortion can be a
health service like any other, but it is not,” because access and funding for abortion
procedures are restricted in practice). Indeed, the project of bringing reproductive rights
under the rubric of a negative health care right may well indirectly support the broader
feminist project of assimilating reproductive health care, in all its manifestations, to the
international right to health and basic health care.
119
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982,
ch. 11, §7 (U.K.) (“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.”).
120
121

Rodriguez v. Attorney General, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, ¶¶ 31–35 (Can.).

Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC)
¶¶ 67–68 (S. Afr.) (citing Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2001
(1) SA 46 (CC) ¶ 44 (S. Afr.)); Soobramoney v. Minister of Health 1997 (12) BCLR 1696
(CC) ¶ 42 (S. Afr.) (Madala, J., concurring) (“[T]he guarantees of the Constitution are not
absolute but may be limited in one way or another.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 4, at 4;
Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in
Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 169 (2008) (discussing balancing with respect to
the right to health under the South African Constitution).
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III. TOWARD A RIGHT TO HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES
In describing several features of a negative right to health as it may
be understood in South African and Canadian constitutional jurisprudence,
this Article does not necessarily make the claim that the U.S. Supreme
Court is likely to draw on foreign legal sources in developing a new right
under the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, the Supreme Court is notoriously
hesitant to expand the scope of substantive due process. 122 Moreover,
explicit borrowing from other countries’ jurisprudence is both unlikely for
the foreseeable future and possibly a perilous matter, given that the project
of determining the suitability of adopting aspects of another nation’s legal
system is mired in practical and conceptual difficulty. 123
Rather, this Article makes two more modest claims. First, it argues
that a negative right of noninterference with medical treatment decisions
has already been recognized to some extent within our own constitutional
jurisprudence. 124 As such, it may be possible and useful for reproductive
rights advocates to foreground this doctrine in combination with the other
legal arguments that are usually made in reproductive rights cases and
scholarship. This notion of “the right to health” may also be deployed to
frame new legal challenges to restrictions on abortion rights, particularly
with respect to certain kinds of regulations that are generally upheld under
current doctrine. 125 Because they are easily assimilated into the negative
structure of American constitutional rights and closely related to the
protection of reproductive rights in their respective countries, the Chaoulli
and TAC cases suggest the contours of the health care right and the lines
along which an argument relying upon that right might be made.
Second, this Article argues that advocates and scholars interested in
achieving greater protection for reproductive rights in the United States
should look to the negative right to health outlined in the Canadian and
122
See, e.g., Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due
Process Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409, 428–29, 430 (2006) (noting
courts’ hesitance to recognize new constitutional substantive due process rights).
123
See Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest: Observations on Some Putative
Benefits of Studying Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 325 (1998)
(examining the problems associated with “constitutional borrowing or lending”).
124
See Hill, supra note 50, at 329–32. See generally Robertson, supra note 118
(discussing the negative right to health); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited
Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1824 (2007)
(arguing that there is a constitutional “right to defend oneself using medical care”).
125

See infra Part III.B.
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South African decisions as a potential additional rhetorical framework for
talking about reproductive rights. The negative right to health will not
necessarily expand access to reproductive health care for women who lack
it, nor will it inevitably protect the core of Roe v. Wade. It should therefore
be a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, the other ways in which
courts and scholars currently view reproductive rights.
A. Locating the Negative Right to Health
The traces of a negative right to health—that is, a right to make
medical treatment decisions without government interference—run through
a long line of Supreme Court and lower court cases. Elsewhere, it has been
argued at length that despite a significant degree of confusion in Supreme
Court case law and a lack of explicit recognition, the existence of such a
right can be inferred. 126 This Article will only summarize that argument
here. In so doing, however, this Article acknowledges that the negative
constitutional right to health is not one to which courts explicitly refer or
which has formed the basis of major Supreme Court holdings. Instead, it is
a strain that intersects and overlaps with other rights in a wide range of
substantive due process cases. Its existence, while implicit, cannot simply
be ignored or explained away, because some Supreme Court holdings—
particularly in the abortion context, but elsewhere as well—are almost
impossible to explain without it.127
Thus, while it may initially sound novel, the right to protect one’s
health has long made appearances in our constitutional jurisprudence;
indeed, some have argued that the right finds its roots in the common–law
right of self–defense. Professor Eugene Volokh, for example, has recently
argued that there is a right to “medical self–defense,” which may be defined
as “a right to defend oneself using medical care.”128 Arguably, there is no
126
See Hill, supra note 50, at 329-32 (arguing that “the Supreme Court has already
recognized a substantive-due-process right to make medical treatment choices,” although
that the courts have not always embraced that right”).
127

See infra text accompanying notes 128-148.

128
Volokh, supra note 124, at 1824. Given the long pedigree and fundamental
quality of this assumed right to protect one’s life and health, some have argued that even if
Roe v. Wade were overruled, some constitutional limitations would likely apply to states’
ability to outlaw abortions needed to prevent serious damage to one’s health. Richard H.
Fallon, If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 611, 626 (2007). Professor Fallon argues that these questions would arise
under even mere rationality review of abortion legislation. He does not, however, argue that
there is a specific constitutional right to access medical treatment. Id.; see also Michael C.
Dorf, The Supreme Court’s Surprisingly Unanimous Abortion Decision: A Parting Gift for
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way to understand the requirement that abortion regulations must contain an
exception to protect against harm to a woman’s health other than as a
statement of the negative right to health. 129 This concept was first
announced in Roe v. Wade, but the Court has consistently adhered to it
through Stenberg v. Carhart and still assumed its validity in Ayotte v.
Planned Parenthood and Gonzales v. Carhart. 130 Indeed, this right to a
health exception—or the right to noninterference by government in a
woman’s decision to protect her health through an abortion—applies even
post-viability, after the government interest in the fetus has become
sufficiently compelling to override the woman’s interest in personal
autonomy and reproductive choice.131 The health exception requirement
therefore does not emerge solely from the right to procreative choice, nor is
it even clearly related to that right. The right to seek a life or health–
preserving medical procedure appears to be an independent constitutional
command, having little to do with the right to make autonomous decisions
about childbirth and other intensely personal matters.132
Thus, in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 133 which held unconstitutional a state law requiring
physicians to use the abortion method most likely to preserve the life and
health of a viable fetus if that method was not significantly riskier for the
woman, the Supreme Court explained in no uncertain terms that the state
Justice
O’Connor?,
FINDLAW’S
WRIT,
Jan.
30,
2006,
http://writ.findlaw.com/dorf/20060130.html (arguing that a minor woman “has a
constitutional right to be free of state regulation that effectively subjects her to a serious risk
of losing a limb,” and that even if Roe v. Wade were overruled, it would remain a genuine
constitutional question whether an abortion ban that lacks a health exception would be
constitutional).
129

Volokh, supra note 124, at 1824–26; see also Hill, supra note 50, at 329–32.

130
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161 (2007); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood
of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 327 (2006); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) ;
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113, 164-65 (1973).
131
Volokh, supra note 124, at 1824–26. Professor John Robertson has advocated
for the existence of a negative right to health care services and has also, like Volokh,
explicitly linked that right to “a legal tradition of lawful self-defense and Supreme Court
precedents about the importance of protecting life over claims to end it.” Robertson, supra
note 118, at 16; see also John A. Robertson, Embryo Culture and the “Culture of Life”:
Constitutional Issues in the Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 7–15.
132

See infra text accompanying notes 133-140.

133

476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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cannot “require the mother to bear an increased medical risk in order to
save her viable fetus.” 134 The Tenth Circuit echoed the Thornburgh Court
by holding a similar statute unconstitutional, concluding, even after the
Supreme Court’s modification of abortion law in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, that “the woman’s health must be the physician’s ‘paramount
consideration.’” 135
Stenberg v. Carhart (the first “partial–birth” abortion case)
represents the most robust recognition of the negative right to health.136 In
Stenberg, the Court struck down a Nebraska law banning the abortion
procedure referred to as “D&X” in part because it lacked a health
exception. 137 The Court recognized that the purpose of the law was not fetal
preservation; rather, the law was simply aimed at preventing the use of one
abortion method that the state found repugnant but that medical experts
deemed safest for some women. 138 The effect of the ban on D&X would not
be to prevent particular women from obtaining abortions, but rather to
require them to obtain abortions by a riskier method. As such, Stenberg did
not revolve around the right to choose abortion per se, but rather focused on
the right to protect one’s health by choosing the method by which the
abortion would be performed. In striking down the Nebraska ban, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that alternative procedures were available but
nonetheless held that the Constitution forbids imposing the “significant
health risks” on women that were mandated by this particular ban. 139 By
vindicating a woman’s right to choose the safest abortion procedure for her,
Stenberg may be understood as upholding a right against government
interference in medical treatment decisions. 140

134
Id. at 769; see also Northland Family Planning Clinic v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323,
339-40 (6th Cir. 2007).
135

Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996) (per curiam).
136

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).

137

Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 929–31.

138

Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 934–36 (discussing the health-related findings of the
District Court); cf. id. at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that “this law does not save
any fetus from destruction”).
139

Id. at 931.

140

Id. at 936–38; see also Hill, supra note 50, at 291–92.
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The Court’s more recent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart 141
significantly cut back on the scope of Stenberg’s holding. Without
overruling Stenberg, the Court in Gonzales nonetheless upheld a federal ban
on the D&X procedure, even though that ban, like the Nebraska law at issue
in Stenberg, lacked a health exception and therefore imposed risks on
women who needed the procedure to protect their health.142 The Court
rejected the plaintiffs’ claims because it felt that a facial challenge was
inappropriate in this particular set of circumstances: the statute had not yet
been applied, there were disputes as to the relevant medical facts, and no
plaintiff was presenting an actual medical need for the procedure. 143
It would nonetheless be inaccurate to say that the Court did away
with Stenberg’s holding altogether and the negative right to health. The
Court continued to recognize that abortion restrictions that impose
significant health risks on women are unconstitutional; indeed, it clearly
stated that “[t]he prohibition in the Act would be unconstitutional, under
precedents we here assume to be controlling, if it ‘subject[ed] [women] to
significant health risks.’” 144 If one takes the Court’s language at face value,
it seems the Court rejected the challenge because of its procedural posture.
It appeared to leave intact the underlying substantive doctrine forbidding
the government from imposing significant health risks on women through
abortion restrictions. Thus, Gonzales does not undermine the notion that the
negative right to health—the right to protect one’s health through seeking
medical care without government interference—has been consistently
recognized in abortion case law.
Outside the abortion context, the recognition of the right has been
less consistent, although several cases suggest the existence of some sort of
right to protect one’s health, often accompanied by a willingness to leave to
the patient and his or her physician the question of how best to do so. For
example, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 145 which upheld a compulsory
141

550 U.S. 124 (2007).

142

Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 155–56.

143

Id. at 166–68.

144

Id. at 161 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S.
320, 320 (2006)); cf. David J. Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future
of Abortion Law, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (arguing that Gonzales “has had and likely will
continue to have far more modest consequences than many critics and commentators initially
proclaimed”).
145

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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vaccination law and is often seen as emblematic of courts’ willingness to
allow public health needs to override individual rights, the Court
nonetheless suggested that individuals have a right to protect their health
against state–imposed harm from required vaccines. 146 Additionally, in
Whalen v. Roe, 147 the Court spoke in dicta of the “right to decide
independently, with the advice of [a] physician, to acquire and use needed
medication.” 148
Lower courts have recognized the right on occasion as well. In
Andrews v. Ballard, the district court, in striking down a law prohibiting
non–physicians from practicing acupuncture, stated that the “decision to
obtain or reject medical treatment” was a fundamental right that could be
analogized to the privacy right recognized in Roe. 149 Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit announced in the pre–Griswold case of England v. Louisiana Board
of Medical Examiners that the plaintiffs could challenge a law prohibiting
the practice of chiropractic medicine on due process grounds, asserting that
“the State cannot deny to any individual the right to exercise a reasonable
choice in the method of treatment of his ills.”150 More recently in 2006, the
D.C. Circuit held that individuals had a substantive due process right to
access an experimental cancer drug that had passed only the initial stage of
FDA review. 151 Although that ruling was subsequently vacated by the en
banc court, even that court left open the possibility that government

146

Id. at 39 (asserting that a mandatory vaccination statute would have to provide
exceptions in cases where the vaccination would likely result in death or serious harm to
health); see also State v. Hay, 35 S.E. 459, 461 (N.C. 1900) (noting that a health exception to
a mandatory vaccination law was required).
147

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).

148
Id. at 603 (upholding a New York statute requiring disclosure of the names of
patients receiving prescriptions for certain drugs to the state health department against
constitutional challenge). Other cases cut precisely in the opposite direction, suggesting that
no right to medical autonomy exists. See Hill, supra note 50, at 284–86. This Article argues
that courts’ unwillingness to recognize such a right in some contexts has been largely (and
wrongly) created by their tendency to defer in reflexive fashion to government claims of
protecting public health. Id. at 286.
149

Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1980).

150

Eng. v. La. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 259 F.2d 626, 627 (5th Cir. 1958).

151
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d
470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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interference with individuals’ access to medical treatment might implicate a
fundamental right. 152
At the same time, a number of cases can be found that hold or
suggest that no negative right to health exists. These cases range from the
lower court cases denying access to laetrile and medical marijuana,153 to
another case denying access to an experimental cancer drug. 154 It cannot
therefore be asserted without hesitation that the negative right to health is
on firm footing in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. It is nonetheless
undeniable that cases both within and outside the abortion context rely on
such a right. Although it is not often explicitly articulated as such, the
notion of a right to seek medical treatment without government interference
explains and renders coherent much of the substantive due process
jurisprudence just discussed.
Of course, as with any constitutional right, the right to
noninterference in health care decision making is not unlimited. Case law
suggests that the right may be limited by the need to protect the public from
an imminent threat or by other important government interests. 155 Thus,
while the Supreme Court’s recognition of a right to health in the abortion
cases has been particularly robust, it has declined to recognize a right to
assisted suicide. 156 Although a right to choose assisted suicide would not
exactly be a right to protect one’s health, a right to seek medical
intervention to end one’s life would be encompassed within a broad
understanding of the negative right to health. Yet, Glucksberg does not
entirely undermine the notion that such a right exists. First, Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Glucksberg, which provided the
necessary fifth vote, declined to hold that there was no right to seek medical
intervention to end physical suffering. 157 Instead, it insisted that even if
there were such a right, the state’s interest in preserving life was sufficiently

152

Id. at 701–03.

153

See, e.g., Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980)
(laetrile); United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1102–03 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (medical marijuana).
154

See, e.g., Smith v. Shalala, 954 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996) (cancer drug).

155

See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25–26 (1905).
156

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.

157

Id. at 736–38. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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strong to overcome it.158 Moreover, a majority of the Justices in Glucksberg
suggested that there may be a constitutional substantive due process right to
receive palliative medication, even in a quantity that might hasten death.159
As Glucksberg establishes, although the negative right to health may be
limited by valid governmental interests, that right runs through a long line
of Supreme Court case law. Indeed, some aspects of that case law, such as
the post-viability health exception requirement in abortion cases and much
of the Glucksberg Court’s discussion, would be unexplainable without it. 160
B. Refr aming the Abor tion Right as a Negative Health Car e Right:
Legal Implications
This Article has elucidated the contours of a possible negative right
to health and argued that it already exists, at least in incipient form, in U.S.
constitutional law. Yet given the developed case law and scholarship
surrounding abortion, in particular the persistent calls to think of the
abortion right in terms of concepts such as equality and dignity, 161 and in
light of the criticisms of the “medical model” of abortion outlined above,
why turn to this comparatively narrow and somewhat controversial right to
frame reproductive rights? This Article argues that there are several
advantages—political, rhetorical, and legal—to be gained from thinking of
158

Id. at 736–37 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

159
Id. at 736–38 (O’ Connor, J., concurring); id. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring);
id. at 779–82 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 791–92 (Breyer, J., concurring). But see Norman
L. Cantor, On Kamisar, Killing, and the Future of Physician-Assisted Death, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 1793, 1835 (2004) (“The legal status of terminal sedation is still unclear.” (citing
Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas III, The Legal Bounds of Physician Conduct
Hastening Death, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 142–50 (2000))).
160

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992);
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768–69 (1986);
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Central
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 76–79 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973). In
Stenberg, the Court described this jurisprudence as establishing that “the State may promote
but not endanger a woman’s health when it regulates the methods of abortion.” Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 931 (2000).
161
See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 382–83 (1985); Siegel, Reasoning, supra
note 36, at 351 (urging reconsideration of the abortion right in terms of equality rather than
“physiological reasoning”); Siegel, Dignity, supra note 42, at 1703 (framing the abortion
debate in terms of competing conceptions about dignity); Siegel, New Politics, supra note
42, at 994 (advocating an equal protection approach to “woman protective” abortion
legislation”).
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reproductive rights as health care rights for those who wish to gain lasting
protection for those rights. 162
One of the most important advantages to be gained from advocating
and foregrounding the negative constitutional right to health is that it may
provide a framework for challenging various sorts of legal restrictions that
are usually upheld under current abortion doctrine. Before explaining in
greater detail what the right to health might do, however, it is important to
emphasize what it will not do. First, it most likely will not improve access
to reproductive health services for women who cannot afford them or
otherwise cannot obtain them due to practical obstacles, such as living in
areas where there are few providers of such services. Second, it will not
necessarily be sufficiently robust to ensure that the core of Roe is preserved.
Although the negative right to health has numerous implications in the
abortion context, the notion that individuals have a right to make medical
treatment decisions without interference from the government is probably
not enough, alone, to ground the right to choose nontherapeutic abortion.
Even if courts do recognize that a right to make medical treatment decisions
without government interference must operate in the abortion context, they
will still be compelled to weigh that right against the state’s interest in the
fetus. 163 It is certainly conceivable that that state interest would be judged to
win out over the woman’s right to medical decision–making autonomy. In
other words, abortion, even early abortion, will likely never be viewed in
the United States as just another medical procedure. The political stakes are
too high and the morally fraught nature of the procedure is too inescapable.
Nonetheless, many contemporary legal controversies concern abortion
restrictions that are not directly justified by a state interest in protecting
fetal life. Couching the right involved in such cases in terms of a right to
medical decision–making autonomy might provide a superior framework
for vindicating women’s rights.
The aim of this Section is not to set out a detailed legal framework
for analyzing various abortion regulations in terms of a right to health, nor
is it to develop a comprehensive right–to–health jurisprudence. Instead, this
162

Cf. Robertson, supra note 118, at 19 (suggesting that even if Roe were
overturned, the government may not be able to ban abortions needed to protect health or life,
due to the negative right to medical treatment).
163

In general, the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence applies heightened
scrutiny to government-imposed burdens on rights recognized as fundamental but still
requires some form of weighing of the importance of those rights against the state interests
served by the restrictions. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721-22; Casey, 505 U.S. at 869
(holding that the woman’s procreative liberty must be weighed against the state’s interest in
potential life).
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Section suggests several instances in which reconceptualizing abortion
rights as an aspect of the negative right to health might provide stronger and
a more coherent standard for challenging certain kinds of abortion
restrictions, particularly those that are not directly motivated by the state’s
interest in the fetus.
1. Informed consent. The often onerous informed consent
requirements applied in many states exclusively to the abortion procedure
are classic examples of abortion regulations that are not, generally speaking,
primarily concerned with fetal protection, but rather with controlling the
conditions under which women can obtain legal abortions.164 Examples of
such informed consent requirements include “fetal pain” laws, in which
women must be told that a fetus over a particular gestational age may feel
pain (sometimes accompanied by a requirement that she be offered
anesthesia for the fetus), 165 and the South Dakota informed consent law,
recently upheld by the en banc Eighth Circuit in Planned Parenthood v.
Rounds, that requires women seeking abortions to be told that an abortion
“terminate[s] the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.” 166
164

Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed
Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 125, 146 &
nn.206–07 (2008) (noting that informed consent statutes may be designed to discourage
women from choosing abortion but also that they may be aimed at increasing women’s
anxiety about abortion, encouraging women to choose anesthesia for the procedure, and
indirectly increasing the cost of abortions); cf. Linda C. Fentiman, Pursuing the Perfect
Mother: Why America’s Criminalization of Maternal Substance Abuse Is Not the Answer—A
Comparative Legal Analysis, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 389, 417-18 (2009) (noting that
abortion informed consent statutes are unusual in that they mandate the substance of the
physician’s communication, whereas “most American informed consent law focuses on the
process of ensuring full communication between patients and their healthcare providers
rather than the content of the physician-patient dialogue, relying on the healthcare
professional to determine what information to convey to a particular patient based on her
own individual needs” (footnotes omitted)).
165
Nine states in all require that women seeking abortions be given information
about fetal pain. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING
PERIODS
FOR
ABORTION
(SEPT.
1,
2009),
available
at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf. For some examples, see ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-16-1105 (requiring that certain women seeking abortions be given
information about fetal pain); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-4 (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.35.6 (2001) (same); MINN. STAT. § 145.4243(a)(3) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 1-738.10 (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305-2(a)(iv)(A).
166
Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2008) (en
banc). The South Dakota statute further defines “human being” as “individual living member
of the species of Homo sapiens, including the unborn human being during the entire
embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full gestation.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A1(4) (2009).
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One might also include within this class the requirement in some states that
a woman seeking an abortion view an ultrasound of the fetus before going
ahead with the procedure.167 They are measures whose primary effect—and
perhaps whose primary aim—is to make abortions riskier, more expensive,
and/or more traumatic.
Of course, some of those laws may well have been motivated in
part by some legislators’ sincere view that such information is necessary to
decide whether to have an abortion. 168 Many supporters of such laws no
doubt believe that women would choose not to have abortions if they had
access to this information. However, the laws are unlikely to have such an
effect. Indeed, at least one commentator has argued that “even where
mandated disclosures are . . . calculated to dissuade, it is far from clear that
a significant number of women will actually forego abortions as a result.”169
Thus, “[t]he harm of such requirements most likely lies less in scaring
women into not getting abortions, but in elevating the fear and anxiety
women experience when they do have abortions.” 170

167

Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a
Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 377 (2008). Currently, five states—Alabama,
Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma—require physicians to perform
ultrasounds and to offer the ultrasound for viewing by the patient before terminating a
pregnancy in at least some cases. ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4(b)(4) (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36-2301.02; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.012(d)(4); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.35.2(C) (1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-34(1) (2007). Eleven other states have
laws either requiring women to be offered a view of the ultrasound only if the physician
decides to perform one or allowing women to request a view of the ultrasound. GUTTMACHER
INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND (SEPT. 1, 2009), available
at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf. Oklahoma’s statute was
recently struck down in a legal challenge captioned Nova Health Systems v. Henry. OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-738.3b (West 2008); see Steven Ertelt, Oklahoma Judge Tosses
Abortion-Ultrasound law on Procedural Technicality, LIFENEWS, Aug. 18, 2009, available
at http://www.lifenews.com/state4356.html.
168

Sanger, supra note 167, at 376–77. Fetal pain laws are somewhat different from
mandatory ultrasound laws in that the fetal pain laws often require false, or at least
misleading, information to be given to women about fetal pain. See generally Tobin, supra
note 164, at 143–48; Robert M. Godzeno, Note, The Role of Ultrasound Imaging in Informed
Consent Legislation Post-Gonzales v. Carhart, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 285, 311 (2009).
169
Tobin, supra note 164, at 125. For example, women were willing to undergo
high levels of risk to obtain abortions in the pre-Roe era. Id. at 125 n.79 (citing LESLIE J.
REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE AND LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 1867–1973, 193–215 (1997)).
170

Id.
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Such laws might be effectively challenged within a framework that
defined state–imposed stress and other such psychological harm as a result
of such regulations affecting access to medical services as a violation of the
right to health, as in the Canadian cases. Because such informed consent
requirements often impose stress and anguish without any real medical
benefit, they can be viewed as unacceptable intrusions into the medical
decision–making process, which should instead be left largely to the patient
and her physician. 171 Framing the abortion right as a right to autonomy in
access to medical treatment and in making decisions about medical
treatment may thus provide a viable route for challenging ultrasound
requirements and fetal pain laws.
Of course, any such interference or state–mandated harm would
have to be balanced against any legitimate government interests served by
the legislation. Nonetheless, viewing the right to seek medical care and to
make medical decisions without government interference as fundamental
would presumably result in more exacting review of such informed consent
laws than the existing regime derived from Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
which explicitly approves informed consent requirements so long as they
are “truthful and nonmisleading,” regardless of how burdensome or
coercive they may be. 172 Indeed, it is doubtful that any of the current
ultrasound laws could be considered an undue burden under Casey, since
they likely do not present a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion. 173
Even to the extent that they may raise the cost of abortions, such increased
cost is likely insufficient to constitute an undue burden on the abortion
right, as the Casey Court itself made clear.174
Additionally, the Canadian and South African cases explicitly
recognize that delay caused by administrative and bureaucratic structures
affecting access to health care may itself be a form of state–imposed harm.
171
See generally Sanger, supra note 164, at 397–401 (discussing how mandatory
ultrasound statutes are designed to, and do, interfere with the woman’s autonomous decisionmaking process).
172
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992); see also
Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 733–34 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(identifying Casey’s standard as the applicable one in a challenge to South Dakota’s onerous
informed consent law); id. at 737 (noting that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of
showing that the law was “untruthful or misleading”).
173
See, e.g., Godzeno, supra note 168, at 313–14 (suggesting that mandatory
ultrasound laws most likely do not constitute an undue burden under Casey).
174

Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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A focus on delay in accessing services and the harm that can flow from that
delay may provide an effective device for challenging in–person informed
consent laws that are combined with a waiting period. These laws often
result in substantial delay in obtaining the abortion, along with all of the
health risks associated with that delay. Courts in the United States have
repeatedly recognized that delay in access to abortion is a form of
interference with “medically appropriate treatment.” 175 At the same time,
courts almost universally uphold such waiting periods because they do not,
under Casey, appear to constitute a substantial obstacle to accessing the
procedure itself. 176
Viewing abortion rights as an aspect of the negative right to health,
moreover, would constitute a partial return to the medical model of
abortion, in which abortion is treated in most respects like any other
medical procedure. This approach mirrors somewhat the approach of the
Canadian and South African constitutions, which make strong and explicit
connections between the right to choose abortion and the right to make
medical treatment decisions in other areas. Such an approach—viewing
abortion as just another medical procedure, at least with respect to laws
such as informed consent requirements where fetal protection is not actually
the goal—might be more protective of women’s autonomy than the current
approach. As Professor Maya Manian has demonstrated, the law of
informed consent in the abortion context has increasingly diverged from the
general law of informed consent since the early post–Roe cases, in which
the Supreme Court struck down intrusive informed consent and counseling
requirements. 177 The height of this divergence may well be Gonzales v.
175

Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Owens, 287 F.3d 910, 920 (10th Cir. 2002) (agreeing
with the lower court that a “forty-eight-hour delay required by the [parental notice law]
would interfere with the medically appropriate treatment—an abortion—for these women”);
A Woman’s Choice—East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1173
(S.D. Ind. 2001) (noting harmful delay caused by in-person informed consent law, combined
with a waiting period), rev’d, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002).
176
See, e.g., Cincinnati Women’s Services, Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 372–74 (6th
Cir. 2006); A Woman’s Choice—East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 693
(7th Cir. 2002) (upholding Indiana waiting period law and noting that “[n]o court anywhere
in the country (other than [the court below]) has held any similar law invalid in the years
since Casey”); Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 531–32 (8th Cir. 1994);
Utah Women’s Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482, 1487–91 (D. Utah 1994), rev’d in
part, 75 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995).
177

Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion
Decision-Making, DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 225, 244–47 (2009) (discussing City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)).

2008]

Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights

43

Carhart, in which the Court accepted paternalistic “woman–protective”
reasoning for both allegedly protecting women from psychological harm by
banning an abortion procedure altogether and subjecting some women to
serious physical risks. And according to Manian, “Carhart’s ‘woman–
protective’ rationale has already had significant impact in the courts and in
the public arena, as exhibited particularly by legislatures enacting even
more biased ‘informed consent’ laws, such as the legislation recently
upheld in South Dakota.” 178 It is thus reasonable to think that keeping
abortion rights and reproductive health care within the general legal
framework regulating health care might have led courts in a notably
different direction. 179
2. Bans on particular methods of abortion. A medical autonomy
framework also better explains precisely what is so problematic about both
the so–called “partial–birth abortion” bans and other regulations of abortion
methods, such as recent attempts to regulate the abortion drug
mifepristone. 180 “Partial–birth” abortion bans do not prevent women from
obtaining abortions but simply require them to have abortions by riskier
methods. As explained above with respect to Stenberg v. Carhart and
Gonzales v. Carhart, such bans are thus not aimed directly at the right to
choose abortion in the way that the criminal prohibition at issue in Roe v.
Wade was; nor are they technically about relegating women to a particular
status in society through forced childbearing. Rather, they are aimed at
intruding on the doctor–patient relationship in a way that forces women to
undergo risks to their health that they and their doctors feel are unnecessary
and excessive. As such, robust recognition of a right to avoid state–
mandated physical harm and to seek medical care autonomously and
without interference from the state could well provide more protection to
women for whom such banned procedures are deemed more medically
appropriate. 181
178
Id. at 289 (discussing Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724
(8th Cir. 2008)).
179

Cf. Rebecca Dresser, Protecting Women from Their Abortion Choices, 37
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13, 14 (2007) (“It is difficult to see why the worry about patients’
sensibilities merits denying them access to only one of many possibly disturbing medical
interventions.”).
180
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.123 (West 2004); OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-729
(West 2008).
181

Indeed, such a right would look very much like the standard articulated in
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), according to which a statute lacking a health
exception is unconstitutional if it imposes significant health risks on some women, id. at
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Similarly, litigation is currently pending in Ohio over a law that
purports to require physicians to prescribe the abortifacient mifepristone at
an unnecessarily high dosage and only through seven weeks of pregnancy,
although it can be used safely and effectively at a lower dosage until at least
eight or nine weeks. 182 What is so troubling about a law that might prescribe
dosages and unnecessary time limitations on the abortion drug is that it
interferes in the doctor–patient relationship in ways that are medically
unnecessary and inappropriate. It interferes with women’s medical
autonomy and may impose physical or psychological injury by forcing
some women, such as those who are beyond the statute’s time limit, to
choose surgical abortion procedures when they would prefer equally safe
and effective medical abortions. 183 It attempts to micromanage the
physician–patient relationship and may impose additional and unnecessary
financial and emotional costs on patients.
The “undue burden” framework set forth in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey fails to capture those troubling aspects of such laws. Under Casey,
abortion restrictions are unconstitutional only if they place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion, and delay and
increased cost alone cannot constitute undue burdens. 184 The notion that an
937–38. But the litigation over this issue has centered on the health exception requirement,
derived from Roe but never explicitly justified in terms of a negative right to health. The lack
of explicit justification for the health exception requirement may partly explain the Court’s
decision to depart from Stenberg in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). Again,
making the negative right to health explicit and grounding the unconstitutionality of the
D&X ban in that right might have better protected a woman’s right to choose the most
medically appropriate abortion procedure for her; it would have arguably justified facial,
rather than as-applied, invalidation of the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act at issue in
Gonzales v. Carhart as an unwarranted intrusion in the doctor-patient relationship, in
addition to an imposition of physical harm by the state.
182

Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Strickland, 531 F.3d 406 (6th Cir.
2008); Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2006).
Although it is unclear whether the law does ban these uses of the drug; the state has taken the
position that it does so. In the interest of full disclosure, this Author is lead counsel for one
of the plaintiffs in this litigation.
183

See, e.g., Joanna N. Erdman, Amy Grenon & Leigh Harrison-Wilson,
Medication Abortion in Canada: A Right-to-Health Perspective, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1764, 1766 (2008) (noting that the advantages of medication abortion that may lead some
women to prefer it over surgical methods).
184

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (defining
“undue burden”). The Court noted that a twenty-four-hour waiting period requiring two trips
to the clinic will increase costs and delay abortions, but found that the measure did not
constitute an undue burden, and held that the fact that the measure limits a physician’s
discretion does not require its invalidation. Id. at 885-86.
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abortion restriction violates the Constitution only if it actually impedes a
woman’s access to abortion by placing a substantial obstacle in her path
misses the various ways in which many abortion restrictions violate
women’s dignity and autonomy within the physician–patient relationship.
Such laws can, however, effectively—and perhaps most effectively—be
framed primarily as a violation of the negative right to health.185 Indeed, at
least one commentator has suggested that denial of access to a preferred
abortion method constitutes a violation of the Canadian and international
right to health. 186
3. Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers (TRAP Laws). The
term “TRAP laws” refers to “laws that single out physicians’ offices and
outpatient clinics where abortions are performed, and subject them to wide–
ranging medical, administrative, and facility requirements that are not
imposed on comparable medical facilities.” 187 TRAP laws often have the
effect, and perhaps the purpose, of increasing the cost of abortion services
both to patients and to clinics. Indeed, some have suggested that TRAP laws
are responsible for running some abortion providers out of business, making
abortions less accessible in any given geographic area.188

185
One might argue that because of the deep political divisions surrounding
abortion rights, the strategy of relating abortion to other forms of health care risks backfiring
by encouraging greater regulation of all health care providers and procedures in order to be
able to regulate abortion. As an empirical matter, it is hard to know how great this danger is.
186

Erdman, et al., supra note 183, at 1766; cf. id. at 1768 (arguing that under the
right to health “[g]overnment may not obstruct the approval of safe and effective medicines,
nor may it remain passive when financial and political barriers impede the introduction of
essential reproductive health medicines”).
187
Amalia W. Jorns, Note, Challenging Warrantless Inspections of Abortion
Providers: A New Constitutional Strategy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1563, 1568 (2005). Such
requirements may include “training and qualification specifications for staff members;
mandatory testing of patients for sexually transmitted diseases, even if unnecessary for their
treatment; requiring employees to submit to physical examinations; and requirements
regarding the physical design and function of the clinic itself”—to the point of
“‘micromanaging everything from elevator safety to countertop varnish to the locations of
janitors’ closets’”—as well as “authoriz[ing] state health departments to inspect the offices
and medical records of abortion providers who are subject to these licensing schemes
without a warrant or probable cause to search.” Id. at 1569 (quoting Greenville Women’s
Clinic v. Comm’r, 317 F.3d 357, 371 (4th Cir. 2002) (King, J., dissenting)) (footnotes
omitted).
188

Id. at 1567.
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However, constitutional challenges to such onerous and
unnecessary abortion–specific regulations have largely failed.189 While
TRAP laws increase the cost of abortions and ultimately render them
inaccessible in some places, they are rarely considered sufficiently onerous
to constitute an “undue burden” on the abortion right under Casey, and they
do not invoke any heightened scrutiny under an equal protection analysis.190
In fact, as Professor Gillian Metzger has argued, TRAP laws often appear to
courts “as a species of ordinary regulation with the effect that courts assess
their constitutionality against the background of the government’s broad
power to regulate in the name of health as well as doctrines of deference to
administrative expertise.” 191 As the Fourth Circuit explained in turning
away a challenge to a North Carolina TRAP law in Greenville Women’s
Clinic v. Bryant, such laws are:
little more than a codification of national medical—and
abortion—association recommendations designed to ensure the
health and appropriate care of women seeking abortions; . . .
[they do] not “strike at the [abortion] right itself”; . . . the
increased costs of abortions caused by implementation of [such
laws], while speculative, are even yet modest and have not been
shown to burden the ability of a woman to make the decision to
have an abortion; and abortion clinics may rationally be regulated
192
as a class while other clinics or medical practices are not.

A doctrine that viewed bureaucratically–imposed obstacles to
obtaining medical care as interfering with a fundamental right, by contrast,
would invoke heightened scrutiny for TRAP laws. The delays in obtaining
abortions and the increased health risks that such delays entail are not
unlike the problems created by the Québec law struck down in Chaoulli as
interfering with the right to security of the person. 193 A right–to–health
framework for analyzing TRAP laws would thus likely protect access to
abortion more fully than Casey’s undue burden standard currently does.
189
Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and Administrative Regulation, 56
EMORY L.J. 865, 873–75, 873 n.29 (2007).
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222 F.3d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992)).
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Of course, some bureaucratic regulation would still be permissible
and even necessary under this new framework. The fundamental right to
noninterference in one’s decision to seek medical treatment would have to
be weighed against certain legitimate government interests, such as safety
and public health. However, at least in the right–to–health framework,
administrative regulations in the form of TRAP laws would receive a higher
level of scrutiny than they currently do, and they would likely be held
unconstitutional more often.
C. Refr aming the Abor tion Right as a Negative Health Car e Right:
Other Implications
In addition to providing new ways of framing various legal issues
pertaining to abortion rights, placing reproductive rights within the broader
framework of health care rights may have several political and rhetorical
advantages. First, putting reproductive rights in the context of health care
rights in general may garner a wider base of political support for
government noninterference with women’s access to reproductive health
care than framing the issue in terms of reproductive choice, privacy, or even
equality has done. The right to health, as a right to medical decision–
making autonomy, is an inclusive concept that touches on areas that are of
concern or likely to one day be of concern to most people. As people age,
they begin to worry more about their future interactions with the medical
establishment in the context of end–of–life decision making, access to
appropriate palliative care, and possibly to experimental drugs; in
particular, they may reasonably fear that intrusive government regulators
will attempt to control those interactions.194 There may be substantial
political support for the idea that the government should not dictate health
care decisions, whether they are decisions about experimental treatments for
cancer or reproductive health care. 195 Indeed, the notion of a right to health
194
Consider, for example, the controversy over the death of Terri Schiavo, the
woman in a persistent vegetative state whose husband faced a long political and legal battle
when he attempted to have her feeding tube removed. Ultimately, the political frenzy over
the right-to-die issue—which included lawmakers discussing in detail the minutiae of Ms.
Schiavo’s medical condition—backfired on conservative lawmakers who had attempted to
prolong Ms. Schiavo’s life. See generally Ruth A. Miller, On Freedom and Feeding Tubes:
Reviving Terri Schiavo and Trying Saddam Hussein, 19 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 161, 180–
81 (2007) (describing the “fascination with the minutiae of [Schiavo’s] bodily function”);
Charles Babington, Post-Schiavo Questions Await Congress’s GOP Leaders, WASH. POST,
Apr. 5, 2005, at A4 (describing the backlash).
195
Cf. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (reversing the appellate panel’s decision that plaintiffs
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is not gender–specific, and therefore may carry a broader political appeal
than the notion of a right to gender equality or reproductive decision–
making autonomy.
Focusing on the medical aspects of abortion may have other
rhetorical advantages as well. Putting the abortion right into this broader
context—the context of medical decision–making—would highlight the fact
that the abortion decision is at least in part a decision about medical
treatment, not merely an economic transaction in which one vulnerable
party stands to be exploited. The view of women as perpetually vulnerable
to the efforts of profit–seeking abortion providers who force them into
procedures they do not want arguably pervades portions of Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, for example. 196 In an area that is
so heavily driven by political rhetoric, influencing the language used to
describe abortion and abortion providers could tip the scales of public and
perhaps even judicial opinion in favor of pro–choice advocates in some
instances. 197
Moreover, emphasizing the medical side of abortion rights may
engage non–obstetrician physicians more in reproductive rights issues.
After all, many of the legal restrictions that apply to abortion providers
would probably strike other physicians as outrageous if applied to them.
Indeed, the Doe v. Bolton court’s embrace of the medical model of abortion,
which compared abortion to “other surgical procedures” and found the
uniquely onerous regulation of abortion to be constitutionally problematic,
is an approach that has largely disappeared from reproductive rights case
had a constitutional right to access experimental cancer drugs that had passed only Phase I
review by the FDA).
196
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“In a decision so fraught with
emotional consequence some doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details of the means
that will be used, confining themselves to the required statement of risks the procedure
entails.”); id. at 183–84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s view, which
relies in part on “women’s fragile state” to deny them reproductive autonomy).
197

Similarly, putting abortion into a broader context of medical treatment may
minimize the tendency on the part of some to forget that the doctors who provide abortions
are “physicians” and not, as Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia referred to them in Stenberg
v. Carhart, “abortionists.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 954 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); id. at 957–79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The word “abortionist” is generally
understood to have negative connotations. In addition, it is often used to refer to nonphysicians who performed abortions when it was illegal, and often did so unsafely. See, e.g.,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 557 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (referring to “back-alley abortionists”). Notably, Justice
Kennedy switched to the term “doctor” in Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124.
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law but that might provide a framework for criticizing many abortion
regulations, especially TRAP laws. 198
IV. CONCLUSION
Although reproductive rights activists often recognize in their
rhetoric and their arguments that the abortion right is at least partly about
the right to make medical treatment decisions autonomously, many feminist
scholars and advocates tend to downplay this argument. It may be time to
re–think that strategy, however, and to embrace this aspect of abortion
rights more fully. This Article recognizes that such an approach will not be
a panacea; it will not necessarily increase access to reproductive health care
for those who cannot afford it, for example. Moreover, such a right would
be subject to balancing against recognized government interests, such as the
state’s interest in potential life and in regulating the practice of medicine in
the interest of safety. Finally, the right—which I contend is already
established, if only implicitly, within substantive due process doctrine—will
no doubt strike some as novel and unlikely to garner the support of courts in
the near future. Nonetheless, it is still a path worth pursuing, given the
relative lack of scrutiny applied to most types of abortion restrictions in the
wake of Planned Parenthood v. Casey 199 and the confused but unpromising
state of abortion jurisprudence in the wake of Gonzales v. Carhart. 200 In
particular, this model possesses potential for reframing—both rhetorically
and legally—some current legal controversies for which Casey’s “undue
burden” standard and even the language of equality and dignity provide
little basis for challenge.
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